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In this study, I explain-as other scholars have-the growing success of radical right parties
in Europe. I also address conceptualization and classification issues. Contrary to other scholars, I
compare party performance across two different elections: European and national. Also unlike
the vast majority of studies that focus exclusively on Western Europe, this study looks more
broadly at all members of the European Union, including those in Central and Eastern Europe.
My main argument is that the radical right will perform better in European than in national
elections. In explaining why parties should perform better in the former rather than the latter, I
emphasize the impact of Reif & Schmitt’s (1980) second order national elections theory and its
implications, and of the electoral system. I also test the impact of one of the most denominated
determinants of the radical right success in national elections. My findings confirm that radical
right parties generally perform better in European elections and that it is mostly because of their
second order national contest nature. The electoral system is also significant, in cases where it
differs across the the elections. Testing for the difference in the radical right parties’ performance
between national and European elections and for the impact of various indicators on the success
of the radical right in national elections also allowed me to reconsider the importance of some of
the most denominated determinants of the success of the radical right and evaluate the validity of
the second order national elections model.
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Introduction
Many observers and journalists emphasized the surprising success of extreme right wing
parties in the elections to the European Union parliament in 2014, and expressed concerns about
the recent growing support of right-wing extremism in Europe. However, if we closely look at
radical right parties’ performance over the past several years, we observe that these assumptions
are mostly incorrect and their predictions exaggerated. First, the radical right is not a recent
phenomenon in Europe. Even though most of the theories about radical right parties are quite
recent, some social scientists have tried to address the reasons for the radical right success for
almost two decades. Betz (1994) points out that radical right parties started to grow as early as in
the late 1980s. I argue that some of these parties emerged even earlier. Some parties have ties to
fascism from the interwar and World War II periods, such as the Italian Social Movement –
National Right (MSI-DN), which was founded in 1946 and gained 56 seats in the Italian
parliament in 1972. Second, the success of the radical right is not constant or growing, but varies
over time (Arzheimer & Carter 2006). For example, Ellinas (2010) observes how support for the
French National Front took off in legislative elections in 1990s only to decrease in the next few
elections. What most scholars have failed to observe is that the support for the radical right not
changes only over time but also varies depending on the type of elections in which the party
competes. This argument might offer a better explanation of the success of the radical right than
the other common theories which have produced very inconsistent results. I argue that radical
right parties will generally perform better in the European Union than in national elections.
There might be several possible reasons for the variation in the party performance across these
two types of elections. Here, I emphasize what I believe are the two most plausible explanations.
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First, parties occasionally compete under different electoral rules in European and
national elections. Maurice Duverger’s (1959) influential theory about mechanical and
psychological effects of electoral rules emphasizes that voters in majoritarian systems think
twice about casting their votes for smaller parties. According to Duverger, disproportionality of
these systems causes underrepresentation and thus causes people to vote strategically to not waist
their votes. The performance of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) across the two
type of elections is a case in point. In 2015 national elections, under majoritarian electoral rules,
UKIP gained only one seat in the House of Commons, whereas it won 27% of the vote in the
elections to the European Parliament under proportional rules.
Second, European elections are only ‘second-order national elections’ (Reif and Schmitt
1980). This means that voters generally think of European elections as less important. Norris
(2005, 151) further argues that elections to the European Union Parliament are simply a midterm referendum on national governments. This may influence the fortunes of radical right
parties. The voters may be more tempted to vote for radical right parties in the European Union
elections as they are less concerned about the possibility that extremists could actually govern
them directly. The voters may also be more prone to listen to the simple messages of theses
parties in the European elections, whereas in the national elections they will expect more detailed
political program that covers a range of issues. Finally, the voter, by voting for the radical right
in second-order European elections, may be sending a message of protest to the mainstream
parties back home. Some scholars argued that it is not the second order national contest nature of
the European elections that makes the smaller parties more successful in them, but particular
European Union issues that smaller parties address in European elections (Ferrara and Weishaupt
2004). Considering the anti-EU agendas of many radical right parties, this suggests another
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reason we should expect them to perform better in the European Union rather than in national
elections.
As Mudde (2007) points out, the research about the radical right is limited to Western
Europe. I include radical right parties from both Western and Eastern Europe. Studying radical
right parties across the European Union avoids the problem of selection bias and selection on the
dependent variable that could lead to biased estimates (Geddes 2003).
The paper is organized as follows: I discuss important problems of categorization and
coding which have affected the results of various studies about the radical right, suggest some
propositions on how to overcome them, and provide an analysis of radical right parties which I
include in my dataset. Second, I examine existing studies that which have tried to explain the
support for the radical right. Third, I demonstrate how the type of elections affects the radical
right vote and theorize about the reasons why radical right parties perform better in European
elections. Finally, I test my arguments and analyze the findings.

1) What is the radical right?
The scholarly work on the radical right has suffered through the years from often
misleading and untested assumptions about radical right parties’ nature. These assumptions may
seem logical at first glance, but do not work well in reality. Mistakes in classifying the individual
parties, a lack of testing, and Western centrism are arguably the main reasons for the inconsistent
results of the studies which have tried to explain the success of the radical right.
As some of the studies about the radical right have correctly pointed out (Mudde 1995,
2007; Ignazi 2003; Hainsworth 2008), there is not standard criteria according to which parties
are classified and defined as radical right. This is potentially a critical problem for studies which
are interested in comparing across states. One simply cannot be an expert on every country. No
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clear definition of the characteristics of the radical right and a general lack of knowledge about
particular parties may lead to the erroneous inclusion of some parties. The end result may include
problems with testing and misleading findings. Therefore, there is a need to clearly establish the
distinctive features of the radical right. Mudde’s (2007) study regarding the populist radical right
is arguably the first large study dedicated mostly to the conceptualization and classification of
these parties. As conceptualization and classification are not the main goals of this study, I
follow Mudde and other scholars who have dedicated a great deal of time and effort to this issue.
However, I also try to update their work and offer my own suggestions.
Some scholars emphasized the problem of how this particular party family should be
classified (Ferraresi 1996; Ignazi 2003; Mudde 2007). However, this study is not interested here
in such terminological battles. In my opinion, it is of minimal importance whether the adjective
in use is ‘extreme’ (Ignazi 2003) or ‘populist radical’ (Mudde 2007). Rather, it is crucial to
understand what makes the party radical or extreme, and what distinguishes it from other
political parties.
In this study, I use the term radical right, which follows Mudde’s (2007) terminology.
The term ‘radical’ stands for the harsh language that these parties adopt when addressing their
political opponents (Betz & Johnson 2004), immigrants, minorities, globalization, and other
issues. I believe that the same definition could be used for the term ‘extreme’ in this context. The
selection of ‘radical’ is merely practical here as Mudde’s work is the one that I am using the
most in this part of the study. More importantly, contrary to Mudde and other authors (i.e. Betz
1994), I am not using the term ‘populist’. Populism can be defined as an ideological feature
which “considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic
groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an
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expression of the general will of the people” (Mudde 2004, 543; 2007, 23). Although I recognize
that populism is an important feature of modern radical right parties, I am not solely interested in
the ‘populist’ radical right, but in the radical right generally. In practice, this means that I am not
excluding the parties which Mudde codes as ‘nonpopulist’ radical right, and others call ‘extreme’
right (Ferraresi 1996; Bustikova & Kitschelt 2011), or ‘old’ and ‘traditional’ extreme right
(Ignazi 1992, 2003). There are ideological differences among the parties, but I do not believe that
subdivision is necessary for this study. Moreover, I argue that this division is also extremely
difficult in practice and only adds to the existing conceptual chaos. I emphasize two reasons
why.
First, there are methodological problems that make this kind of distinction very difficult.
Mudde (2007, 49) argues that ‘nonpopulist’ radical right parties are openly neofascist,
undemocratic, elitist, and therefore non populist. Bustikova & Kitschelt (2011, 148) argue that
the ‘radical’ right pursues authoritarian objectives within the boundaries of the democratic
system, while the ‘extreme’ right wants to replace democracy with authoritarianism. Ferraresi
(1996, 10-11) claims that what he calls the ‘radical extreme’ right embraces violence and illegal
means as a legitimate tool of political struggle. However, he acknowledges that this distinction is
mostly conventional and cannot be followed too rigidly. In my opinion, none of these studies
provide enough evidence for such a division. The theory regarding the necessary subdivision of
the radical right is therefore based mostly on unproven assumptions about certain parties. This is
caused by the fact that it would be difficult in practice to find enough evidence that a given party
is explicitly neofascist, neo-Nazi, elitist or undemocratic. Such divisions also preclude
comparative research and testing.
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Radical right parties in particular are very careful not to overstep certain boundaries of
political conformity erected by the democratic systems in which they compete. Most of the
European postwar constitutions are explicitly antifascist. Therefore, open propaganda of fascist
ideology and ties with the old regimes could potentially mean many years in prison for the
parties’ leaders and members and the dissolution of the parties. In consequence, parties are
usually very well aware of the limits of their rhetoric and actions. Radical right parties are as
strategic as any other political parties. Generally, they find a ‘safe’ level of radicalization to
avoid legal issues and remain attractive to a group of voters. On the other side of the political
spectrum, communist parties face the same kind of issues, especially in Central and Eastern
Europe.
An example of how difficult it is to find sufficient evidence that the party is neofascist,
neo-Nazi, and openly supports violence can be found in the failed attempts (2011, 2012) of
German officials to ban the extremist NPD (National Democratic Party), which Mudde (2007,
49) names as one of the main examples of the ‘nonpopulist’ radical right. The selection of
‘democratic’ in the party name is hardly a coincidence. As argued above, radical right parties are
strategic players. The more extreme the party’s real intentions, the more careful the party will be
about openly expressing them.
Second, contrary to Mudde, I do not believe that the presumed ties with fascism or more
extreme anti-system positions necessarily mean that the party is elitist and not populist. Indeed, I
believe that all modern radical right parties are populist to some extent, whatever their political
doctrines. There is a clear overlap of issues between more and less extreme wings of the radical
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right that makes a distinction among them based on populism very difficult. For example, the
program of the German NPD looks very similar to any other populist radical right party1.
To conclude, trying to forcibly make the separation between the less and the more
extreme radical right seems to produce more damage than utility. For example, Golder (2003) is
trying to make a similar distinction as other authors cited here, using similar criteria, and codes
as neofascist some of the parties that Mudde codes as populist (i.e. British BNP). Therefore,
although it is obvious that there are some differences between the single parties, I believe that to
draw rigid boundaries between the subgroups of the radical right is often very difficult and too
much emphasis on this issue has had only counterproductive results thus far.
To classify radical right parties, we need to look for certain ideological features which
distinguish them from other political parties. I agree with Mudde (2007) that the parties that are
only populist or ethnoregionalist should not be included in the radical right party family.
Recognizing the differences among these parties can sometimes be very tricky. First, one cannot
be an expert on every party or pursue field research in all of the countries of Europe, and
therefore must rely on secondary sources which are sometimes of questionable quality. Second,
there is often scant data available on an individual party. Taking these two points into account,
the classification used in this study is not without weaknesses. I acknowledge possible
shortcomings in the coding of parties from countries which are out of my area of expertize.
I do not believe that trying to enumerate vast and complex sets of distinctive features is
plausible here. Considering the differences between parties and the continuous evolution of their
agendas, it only adds to confusion and it may result in mistakes in classification that could lead
to misleading results. Therefore, I use Mudde’s minimum definition (2007, 15) and emphasize

1

“Themen”, NPD, accessed October 31, 2015, https://npd.de/themen/.

8
only one truly distinctive feature of the radical right. This core feature is a radical form of
nationalism that is similar to what Mudde (2007, 19) refers to as ‘nativism’ and defines it as a
combination of nationalism and xenophobia. Radical right nationalism has to be understood in
terms of this combination.
Scholars have provided different definitions of nationalism. Benedikt Anderson (1983)
defines the nation as an imagined community. It is imagined because, although its members do
not necessarily know each other, they imagine that they live in some sort of communion
together. This community is imagined both as limited by its borders and sovereign. Hobsbawm
(1990) emphasizes the importance of proto-national bounds – or preexisted feelings of collective
belongings – for the creation of such communities, and the necessity of units of territorial
political organization for the modern nationalism. Anthony Smith (1987) suggests two other
important features for nationalism: citizenship (in a legal sense) that connects classes and strata
in a community of theoretical equals and insiders, and common culture that is expressed by
shared meanings and values.
Radical nationalists define the nation in a similar way, but with an emphasis on the
exclusive character of their individual imagined communities. Everything that is outside the
borders of the nation must be necessarily different. The nation in the eyes of radical nationalist is
under continuous attack from the outside and therefore must be protected. Cofrancesco (1986,
66-67) in explaining the differences between the left and the right, argues that the goal of the
right is to defend roots and tradition. For the radical right this applies even more. Preserving
homogeneity of the nation is its ultimate goal.
Radical right parties built their ideology on a dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’ emphasized
by Connor (1994) in his book about ethnic nationalism. ‘Them’ can be distinguished from ‘us’
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by visible and also non-visible ‘cultural’ factors. The latter applies especially in the cases of
ethnic minorities. Bustikova & Kitschelt (2011, 148) use another dichotomy according to which
the radical right should build their ideology: ‘friend’ and ‘foe’. The goal of the radical right
parties is protection of the nation and preservation of national culture and traditions that are
believed to be threatened by ‘them’.
However, we should distinguish who is truly conceived here as an enemy and a threat.
Radical right parties do not automatically see all of the other nations as enemies or inferior. In
many cases, the parties follow at least to some extent De Benoist’s (1983) theory that nations
should be considered different but equal. For instance, many parties believe in cooperation
between individual European countries, even though with clearly defined boundaries and rules.
They do not necessarily consider their nation superior to others. Some parties apply double
standards regarding the sensitive theme of immigration. Immigrants from outside of Europe, and
especially from Muslim countries, are seen as a real threat to the nation, whereas immigrants
from other European countries, or non-European Christians, are arguably more acceptable to the
radical right. For example, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO), Heinz-Christian
Strache, in reaction to the current refugee crisis in Europe, called for the building of an army
patrolled fence on the Austrian border and for admitting Christian rather than Muslim refugees2.
According to Grumke, radical right parties tend to cooperate with each other. He argues that
‘ultranationalist’ ideologies of radical right parties which should erect walls between the single
parties are in reality not a hurdle for cooperation between them. He believes that this is a
consequence of globalization, which is conceived as a common enemy (Grumke 2013, 13).
However, this is not always the case. For instance, Marine Le Pen–the head of the French

2

Heinz-Peter Bader. “Austrian far-right leader balmes U.S., NATO for migrant crisis.” Reuters, September 5, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/05/us-europe-migrants-austria-strache-idUSKCN0R50HP20150905.
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National Front–and Gert Wilders–leader of the Dutch PVV–refused to cooperate with the
Hungarian Jobbik party, the Greek Golden Dawn party, and the Bulgarian Attack party in the
European Parliament3 even though they all share euroskeptic anti-globalization stances.
Moreover, where there are disputes over territory and national minorities, as in the cases
Slovakia and Hungary, the cooperation is barely imaginable.
I suggest that in defining radical right parties, anti-immigration and anti-globalization
policies are key additional features of radical right nationalism. They can both be considered
implications of radical nationalist ideology and can be used as indications that the party is a
member of the radical right party family.
Anti-immigration and anti-minority policies are clear expressions of the nationalist
beliefs examined above. Bustikova & Kitschelt (2011, 148) argue that appeals to the nation and
to the significance of collective national identity are strong indicators that the party is a radical
right one, and a strict refusal of immigration is the product of these appeals. Pardos-Prado (2015,
352) claims that the emergence and stabilization of the radical right in Europe is a consequence
of immigration, and that immigration is at the core of the radical right agenda. In Central and
Eastern Europe, the radical right concentrates more on ethnic minority issues as levels of
immigration are not as large as in Western Europe (Pirro 2014; Mudde 2007). With the current
refugee crisis, there is growing Islamophobia and antipathy toward non-European immigrants
among the public. As a result, many radical right parties in the CEE now see mass immigration
as one of the most important issues on their agendas.
The anti-globalization characteristics of the radical right are another important
implication of radical nationalist ideology and strong indicators of the radical rightism of the

3

David O’Riordan. “Le Pen says no deal between National Front and Jobbik.” Politics.hu, June 6, 2014,
http://www.politics.hu/20140606/le-pen-says-no-deal-between-national-front-and-jobbik/ .
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party. Abedi’s (2004) term ‘anti-political establishment parties’ seems to be a good fit for radical
right parties. The ‘global system’, usually seen as represented by the United States and
multinational institutions like the European Union, is blamed for mass immigration, for
threatening national sovereignty, and for consumerism that threatens the survival of national
culture and the national economy. Former leader of the German NPD, Ugo Voigt, claims that the
consequences of globalization are “poverty, unemployment, dismantling of social services, and
environmental destruction” (Botsch & Kopke 2013, 38). Strache (FPO) blames the United States
and NATO for the recent refugee crisis in Europe4. National governments and politicians are also
often a target for the radical right. They are accused of serving the ‘global system’ and selling
out their nations. In an interview with Hungarian Budapest Times, Márton Gyöngyösi, deputy
leader of Jobbik’s parliamentary fraction, stated that blaming the EU and the West for the
economic problems of the country is not enough and called the political elite of the country coresponsible for the loss of all Hungarian national wealth and all Hungarian national property5. In
some cases, radical right parties have been part of government coalitions and have become more
integrated into the system (i.e. FPO in Austria in 2000). However, according to Hainsworth
(2008, 11), this does not necessarily mean that they have completely abandoned their ideologies
and values that lay outside the mainstream.
The radical left-wing shares some anti-globalization characteristics with the radical rightwing. However, there are clear differences between the two. The anti-systemic features of the
radical right derive from radical nationalism, whereas the extreme left usually rejects nationalism

Heinz-Peter Bader. “Austrian far-right leader blames U.S., NATO for migrant crisis.” Reuters, September 5, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/05/us-europe-migrants-austria-strache-idUSKCN0R50HP20150905.
5
J. Arthur White. “Jobbik to Wilders and Le Pen: liberalism and Zionism are the enemies, not Islam.” The Budapest
Times, February 22, 2014, http://budapesttimes.hu/2014/02/22/jobbik-to-wilders-and-le-pen-liberalism-andzionism-are-the-enemies-not-islam/ .
4
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following the Marxist tradition. Following Bobbio’s universal distinction between right and left
according to their attitudes towards the value of equality, leftists are egalitarians and give
importance to what makes people more equal, even though they recognize that there is no perfect
equality. Rightists, on the other hand, give more importance to what makes people unequal
(Bobbio 1994, 71). Egalitarians believe that inequalities are mostly social and as such can be
eradicated. Anti-egalitarians believe that inequalities are natural and cannot be eradicated (1994,
67). Therefore, the extreme left should be defined as ‘anti-liberal egalitarianism’, whereas
extreme right ‘anti-liberal anti-egalitarianism (Backes 2010, 172).

2) European radical right parties
As suggested by Mudde (2000a, 23-24; 2007, 39), I believe that qualitative content
analysis is the best method to classify radical right parties. I include the most relevant radical
right party for each country that competed in the European Union elections and the closest
national elections. I do not believe that it is necessary to discuss here all individual parties and
their features. I have no reason not to follow to a large extent Mudde’s (2007) classification. His
dataset, however, needs to be updated. For this sake, I provide my own analysis where I believe
this is needed. The list of the parties that I code as radical right can be found in the appendix. I
divide the parties into three groups here.
The first group consists of radical right parties that have been included by Mudde and
have been a part of the European party systems for many years, and as such do not need any
further introduction. These parties have also been included by almost all of the scholars
dedicated to this subject. Among these parties we can count the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO),
the Belgian Flemish interest-former Vlaams Blok (VB), the Brtish National Party (BNP), the
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Danish People’s party (DF), the French National Front (FN), the German Republikaner (REP)
and the National Democratic Party (NPD)6, the Italian League North (LN), and the Swedish
Sweden Democrats (SD).

The second group consists of the parties that Mudde includes, but are not always included
in datasets. This is the result of studies either being out of date or Western-centric. There are no
reasons not to believe that these parties should be classified as radical rightist. These parties
include: The Bulgarian Attack (Ataka), the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), the Polish League of
the Polish Families (LPR), the Portuguese Renovator Party (PNR), the Romanian Greater
Romania Party (PRM), the Slovakian National Party (SNS), and the Slovenian National Party
(SNS).
The third group consists of the parties that Mudde does not include. I believe that this is
primarily because he considers them non populist or not radical enough. Some of them also
might not have existed when he wrote his book. Among these parties we can count the Cypriote
ELAM which is a sister party of the Greek Golden Dawn; the Czech Worker’s Party (DSSS,
previously DS) and Tomio Okamura’s Party of Direct Democracy (SPD) that has yet to compete
in an election; the already mentioned Greek Golden Dawn; the Hungarian Movement for better
Hungary (Jobbik); the Italian neofascist Casa Pound, which under the label “Sovranita”
(Sovereignty) supports Matteo Salvini’s League North; the Latvian National Alliance; the
Maltese Imperium Europa (IE); the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) of Gert Wilders; the Polish
National Movement (RN), which in the October 2015 national elections–as a part of the
Kukiz’15 movement (total 42 seats)–gained 9 seats in parliament; and other smaller parties. In

6

Mudde does not include NPD, because he does not consider it a populist party. I have discussed my reasons why to
include it in the previous parts of this study.
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none of these cases are there reasons to doubt the parties’ radical right affiliation. That is
unfortunately not the case for the other parties in this group. Among those are the Estonian
EKRE, the Finnish Finns Party (PS), the Lithuanian Order and Justice (TT), the Polish Congress
of the New Right (KNP), and the British Independence Party (UKIP). However, after analysis of
these parties’ programs, speeches and interviews with their leaders, and the public image they
possess, I conclude that although there may be some doubts about radical nationalism and antisystemic character of these parties, there are enough indicators to include them in our dataset.
For example, the Estonian EKRE - which was one of the most questionable parties - states in its
manifesto that the demographic situation of the country does not allow any new mass migration.
The main values of the party are family and fatherland, and the party stands against the
destructive ideas of cultural Marxism, multiculturalism, and postmodern liberalism7. Moreover, I
have profited from writing this study during the period of a large refugee crisis in Europe. The
mentioned parties’ reactions to the crisis were generally quite similar in their content to the
reactions of any other radical right party examined here, supporting their assumed radical right
affiliation. Finally, the incentives for the voter to vote for one of these parties will arguably be
the same or similar to those for any other radical right party examined here.

3) Explaining the support for radical right parties
After introducing the conceptualization and classification of the radical right, I
concentrate on the main goal of the research which is to explain the varying rate of success of the
radical right. As was previously mentioned, the support for the radical right is not constantly
growing (Elinas 2010; Mudde 2014). Instead, it varies quite unpredictably over time. This makes
it difficult to identify the factors which could generally explain why people give their votes to the

7

“Bauska Deklaratsioon”, EKRE, accessed October 29, 2015, http://ekre.ee/bauska-deklaratsioon/.

15
radical right. Commonly denominated determinants of the success of the radical right have
largely proven unable to explain the vote for radical right parties across countries and elections.
This may have been caused, among other reasons, by the measurement problems of these
potential causes.
I argue that one of the best explanations for the success of the radical right is the type of
elections in which the party competes. I expect the radical right to generally perform better in
European rather than in national elections. Moreover, the factors which have been proven largely
inconsistent in explaining the electoral fortune of the radical right in national elections, may be
more useful in explaining the difference in the radical right performance between different
elections, which would suggest their persistent importance for radical right voting theories. I
therefore separate out the potential causes of electoral success for the radical right in national and
European elections.

Explanations for the success of the radical right in national elections
The political climate of distrust and disenchantment has been seen as a precondition for
the success of the radical right (Betz 1994, 67). From this perspective, the vote for the radical
right can be seen as a mere protest vote and the radical right parties as ‘parties of discontent’
(1994, 38). However, Betz admits that the protest vote does not have an absolute impact on the
success of the radical right, as radical right parties and electorates violate the conditions
necessary for the protest vote theory to apply. First, voters of radical right parties are not
disinterested in politics. Second, traditional radical right parties in Western Europe managed to
extend their electoral base and develop strong loyalties among their voters. Finally, radical right
voters have been proven to have a distinct ideological identity (1994, 61-63). Therefore, the
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politics of resentment should be rejected as a pure interpretation of the vote for the radical right
and different ideological, socio-economic, and institutional determinants of the electoral fortune
of radical right parties should be explored.
Often denominated determinants of the vote for the radical right are anti-immigration
sentiments on the public demand side, and parties’ ethnocentric and xenophobic appeals against
immigration and ethnic minorities on the party supply side. Betz (1994:64) argues that what most
clearly differentiates the voter of the radical right is the importance he or she gives to certain
issues. Immigration is arguably the most important of them. But is immigration the sole reason
why a voter selects a radical right party?
According to Art (2011, 4), theories about immigration determining the electoral fortunes
of radical right parties are contradicted by examples of countries where high levels of
immigration did not lead to electoral success for the radical right. The main example here,
according to Art, is the case of Sweden. The selection of the Swedish example is unfortunate as
the radical rightist Sweden Democrats gained 20 seats in Swedish Parliament already in 2010,
and 29 seats with almost 13% percent of votes in the last parliamentary elections in 2014.
According to some recent polls, they are now even considered the most powerful Swedish party8.
Nevertheless, Art may still be correct that rates of immigration do not generally determine the
success of the radical right. However, I believe that it is not because immigration issues are not
important to radical right voters, but because immigration rates are not good estimators of the
politics of immigration. I will address this further below.

Richard Orange, “Anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats now the biggest party, according to poll.” The Telegraph,
August 20, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/11814498/Anti-immigrant-SwedenDemocrats-now-the-biggest-party-according-to-poll.html.
8
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Golder (2003, 441), in his cross-national quantitative study assumes that “higher levels of
immigration help extreme right parties”. He argues that if there is a conviction that immigrants
are a threat to national identity and culture, then voters have “no option than vote for the extreme
right” (2003, 439). In his model, Golder estimates immigration using the percentages of foreign
born populations in the individual countries. He finds positive results for his hypothesis when the
vote is for parties that he codes as populist. However, there are several problems here. First,
Golder does not include any Eastern European country in his dataset. In some of the Eastern
European countries, like Hungary for instance, the foreign-born populace is almost nonexistent
and yet there exist successful radical right parties. Second, I argue that the foreign born
population is not a good measure for immigration. As Golder (2003, 445) himself points out,
people do not necessarily know how many immigrants live in the country. And even if they
would know, I argue that what is important are their negative perceptions about migrants and
immigration. People do not necessarily see a large number of foreigners in their homeland as a
problem. Finally, key targets of the radical right are illegal migrants. The foreign born population
variable does not take illegal immigrants into account.
The studies testing similar hypotheses as Golder on the local level produced mostly
consistent results about the impact of immigration on the vote for the radical right. Bonnetain´s
(2004) study about variation of extreme right voting in France demonstrates that high levels of
immigration have a positive impact on the radical right party’s performance. Rink, Phalet, and
Swyngedouw (2008), in testing the factors that suppose to determine electoral success of the
Belgian Vlaams Blok (VB), come to the conclusion that a large immigrant population will
increase support for the party. However, these hypotheses still cannot be considered to have an
absolute value. Generally, the problems with the immigration rates as an estimate for
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immigration persist. For example, in Eastern Germany there is only a very small, if any,
immigrant populace, and yet the extremist NPD usually performs better there than in Western
Germany where the immigrant populace is significantly larger. Moreover, the anti-immigrant
rallies of the PEGIDA9 movement, which is based in Dresden, attracted thousands of people in
Eastern German cities, while mostly failed to have similar success in Western German cities10.
Therefore, immigration rates do not seem to fit as an absolute determinant of the success of the
radical right.
This does not necessarily mean that the issue of immigration should be immediately
rejected as a cause for the vote for the radical right. I believe that other estimates for immigration
are preferable. I rely on Eurobarometer public surveys regarding the most salient national
concerns. The use of surveys should better reflect negative perceptions of immigration among
the population and take account of opinions about illegal immigration. It also shows the
generalized significance of the issue in society. It is clear that not all of the people who expressed
the belief that immigration is the most important issue that their country faces will necessarily
vote for the radical right. However, we can assume that it is almost certain that most radical right
voter will be among them. The use of surveys may be problematic for radical right studies, as
voters are usually reluctant to admit their support for such parties (King 1997; Bloom 2003).
Nevertheless, in this case people expressed their concerns with certain issues and not their direct
support for a particular party. Therefore, I believe that there is no reason to doubt their sincerity
in this case.

9

Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident.
“Record numbers of anti-PEGIDA protesters in Germany.” DW, January 1, 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/recordnumbers-of-anti-pegida-protesters-in-germany/a-18186886.
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In the pan-European context, there may be another problem in explaining the vote for the
radical right through immigration. It is assumed that in Central and Eastern Europe, immigration
should not be a concern as there are few immigrants. Pirro (2014, 247) argues that explaining the
electoral performance of radical right parties in terms of negative perceptions toward
immigration is not very useful in the countries where immigration is not a salient issue.
However, I believe the assumption that immigration is not a salient issue in the CEE might be
erroneous. The previously mentioned case of Eastern Germany demonstrates that it is possible to
gain electoral support with programs based on anti-immigrant policies even though there are
only a few immigrants in the country or region. Again, I argue that what matters here is the belief
that immigration is a concern, and not how many immigrants are in the country. I believe that the
CEE countries are similar to Eastern Germany. Indeed, the reactions of the public in the CEE to
the recent refugee crisis seems to confirm this assumption. Public opinion in the CEE is almost
unanimously against accepting asylum seekers from countries outside Europe, and especially
from Muslim or African countries. Islamophobic and anti-immigrant attitudes are widespread
around the CEE countries even though there are low numbers of Muslims and immigrants from
outside Europe in these countries.
Some scholars argue that more important than immigration in the CEE should be the
issue of ethnic minorities (Mudde 2005; Pirro 2014). However, the testing for the impact of
ethnic minorities on the radical right vote in the CEE has quite surprisingly mostly negative
results. Bloom (2013) concludes that the large minority population in Latvia did not have a
positive impact on the vote for extreme right. Not only the numbers but also the negative
sentiments about minorities do not seem to increase voteshare of radical right parties. For
instance, in the Czech Republic, where xenophobic sentiments against the Roma population and
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anti-Roma rallies are quite common phenomenon, radical right parties mostly failed to gain any
success in both national and European elections. Although the vast majority of the existing
studies about the most successful radical right party in the CEE–Hungarian Jobbik–argues that
the party’s success should be tied with a growing anti-Roma sentiment in the country (i.e. Barlai
& Hartleb 2011), Varga (2014) in his qualitative study argues that there is no empirical evidence
for these statements. He demonstrates with compelling evidence that Jobbik profited more from
the economic discontent of the population than from anti-minority sentiment, and gained success
only after a radical shift in the party program from anti-Roma issues to economic issues in 2010.
Because of problems with the inconclusive findings of studies and measurement and data
problems, I do not test here for the impact of the size of ethnic minorities on the radical right
vote and, as explained above, I believe that immigration is now an important issue in the CEE as
well. Therefore, there should not be a problem in testing for immigration as a determinant of the
radical right success even in the CEE countries.
Worsening economic conditions expressed by high levels of unemployment is arguably
the most often cited economic indicator of the success of the radical right. I believe that the
assumption that unemployment matters derives from the quite common belief that the typical
radical right voter comes from a lower stratum of society that is usually more vulnerable to
unemployment problems. Rink, Phalet, and Swyngedouw (2008) find significant evidence that
voters for the Belgian VB are more likely be people with lower socio-economic status. However,
this might be the case in Belgium, but not necessarily in all of the European countries. Bustikova
and Kitschelt’s (2011, 171) cross-national study concludes that there is a variation in sociodemographic profiles of radical right voters and therefore it is “impossible to create a unified,
cross-national profile of a radical-right voter”. Cross-national studies (Norris 2005; Arzheimer
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and Carter 2006) do not seem to find evidence that high rates of unemployment alone would
have a positive impact on the electoral fortunes of the radical right.
Golder (2003, 439) argues that “unemployment increases the vote for extreme right
parties when immigration is high, and unemployment does not affect (or lowers) the voteshare
received by extreme right parties when immigration is low”. National level studies testing the
impact of unemployment, and of the interaction between high levels of immigration and high
levels of unemployment, ended up with inconsistent results. Bonnetain (2004) argues that in the
case of France, unemployment, as immigration, has a positive impact on extreme right voting.
Rink, Phalet, and Swyngedouw (2008) did not find significant evidence of unemployment
increasing the support for the VB, even where the immigrant population is sufficiently large.
Finally, Bloom (2013) concludes that in Latvia the combination of worsening economic
conditions and a large minority population did not have a positive, but indeed a negative, impact
on the performance of the radical right.
Type of electoral system is often mentioned as an institutional factor that is expected to
affect the electoral performance of radical right parties. According to Jungerstram-Mulders
(2003, 29), “different political systems provide different opportunities and limitations for Far
Right parties to succeed in the electoral arena”. In general, the type of electoral system is
considered to have significant effects on the electoral fortunes of the smaller parties (Duverger
1959; Eatwell 2000). Some scholars have argued that the more proportional the electoral system,
the greater are the chances for extreme right candidate to be elected. By contrast, the less
proportional the electoral systems, the more discouraged will be the voters to select the extreme
right candidates (Jackman and Volpert 1996). This logic follows Duverger’s theory about the
mechanical and psychological implications of the majoritarian system. As the party needs always
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to have a majority to win a seat in parliament, the smaller parties have only limited chances to
get any representation. They will probably be unable to perform better than the larger parties
every time. The system is therefore disproportional, because the percentage of vote does not
determine the level of representation gained. For example, the British UKIP won almost 13% of
votes in the last parliamentary elections, but only held one seat in the House of Commons. As the
voters are well aware of this, they will most likely prefer not to waste their votes and select the
party that has better chances of getting more seats in the parliament (Duverger 1959, 226-26).
Some scholars do not find enough evidence that proportionality of the electoral system
has significant effects on the electoral success of the radical right (Carter 2004; Norris 2005).
Arzheimer and Carter (2006) even find a significantly positive impact of disproportionality on
the success of the radical right. Surprisingly, their study does not include Great Britain which
contrary to most other European countries, has a majoritarian electoral system. In a crossnational study focusing on national parliamentary elections, it would be problematic to find
empirical evidence for the significance of the electoral system, as the vast majority of European
countries adopt proportional electoral systems. However, testing for the difference between party
performances in national versus European parliamentary elections permits me to directly
compare the performance of the same party under different electoral rules, and therefore to
reevaluate the importance of the electoral system for the success of the radical right.

Comparison of radical right performance in EU and national elections
The variation in the success of radical right parties between national and European Union
elections remains largely understudied. This is quite surprising to me as it seems that the radical
right has performed consistently better in European Union than in national elections. One of the
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few scholars that has mentioned the possibility of this variance is Almeida (2012). He argues that
electoral breakthroughs of selected radical right parties suggest that “radical right parties face a
more favorable opportunity structure in the context of European Parliament elections than in
national first-order contests” (2012, 141). However, his study is more centered on the impact of
European integration and does not compare the performance of single radical right parties across
national and European Union elections. Reif (1984) suggested that extremist parties generally
perform better in second-order national elections, but again does not provide a comparison of
single radical right parties’ performances. Hix and Marsh (2007, 501) tested for the radical right
gains and losses in European Union elections, nevertheless it is not quite clear how they have
classified radical right parties, and therefore which parties they include or exclude.
I emphasize the type of election as a possible determinant for the success of the radical
right and compare radical right parties’ performances in European parliamentary elections with
the same parties’ performances in national parliamentary elections. From the first part of the
study, it should be clear which parties I include and why. I discuss and test the possible causes of
the expected difference in the vote. This kind of testing also allows me to reevaluate the
importance of some of the indicators of electoral success of radical right parties that I have
discussed here. I emphasize two possible causes of difference in the party performance between
the two elections: the second order national contest nature of European Union elections, and the
already discussed electoral system.
European parliamentary elections are often viewed as ‘second-order national
competition’ (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Reif 1984; van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Norris 1997,
2005). That is because “they are secondary to the main (national) electoral contest, and they are
‘national’ contests rather than ‘European’ contest” (Hix and Marsh 2007, 496). Reif and Schmitt
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(1980) argue that voters may vote differently in second-order national elections, and favor
smaller rather than larger parties. Reif (1984), as previously mentioned, also suggests that more
extreme parties would gain more seats in second-order national contests. There might be two
possible reasons for this. First, voters might vote more sincerely, rather then strategically, in
second-order national elections (Oppenhuis, van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). Second, the voters
might see European Union elections as a useful tool for them to express their dissatisfaction with
the national government (Hix & Marsh 2007).
The questions that different studies try to answer are how much European Union issues
matter in European elections (Norris 1997; Marsh 1998; Hix & Marsh 2007; Hobolt, Spoon and
Tilley 2008), and therefore to what extent European elections are truly second-order national
contests. Although some scholars suggest that the nature of European Union elections has
changed, and that European issues have begun to matter (Ferrara and Weishupt 2004; Hobolt,
Spoon and Tilley 2008), others conclude that European parliamentary elections are still to a large
extent second-order national contests (Norris 1997; Hix and Marsh 2007). Although I do not
fully discard the possibility that European concerns matter more than they used to, this may be
caused by the fact that European issues have simply become more important in the domestic
political arena (Hix and Marsh 2007, 499; Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley 2008: 112). Considering
this, I argue that it will more likely be the implications of a second-order national elections
model that makes radical right parties perform better in European Union elections. I emphasize
three features of the second order model that should help us understand why radical right parties
should perform better in elections for the European parliament.
First, the aforementioned issue of sincere versus insincere voting might matter. People
who vote in national elections for a party that has better chances of forming a government, but
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who on ideological, group identity, or personal grounds prefer another party, are voting
insincerely. The same voters may be more sincere in European elections and cast a vote for the
party they like best. The consequence is that relatively insignificant parties on the national level
perform better on the European level (Marsh 1998, 593; Almeida 2012, 141). The voter can also
move instrumentally from sincere choice in national elections to insincere in European elections
in order to express temporary dissatisfaction with his or her party (Oppenhuis, van der Eijk and
Franklin 1996, 303-29). The critical fact is that European elections do not select the national
government. When voters are relieved of this kind of responsibility, their behavior may take a
different course (Marsh 1998, 597).
Second, second-order national elections are assumed to be of less importance.
Significantly lower turnouts in European elections suggest that people largely assume that these
election do not matter (Marsh 1998, 597). I argue that this conviction is present among the
people who vote in these elections as well. The consequence is that a voter might be less afraid
to select candidates that are considered controversial or radical. Here as well, the crucial factor is
that these elections do not select the national government, and therefore do not personally affect
the voters in individual countries.
Finally, the single-issue vote is more likely in European Union elections. In first-order
national elections, voters have to consider a complex set of issues, as the choice of the national
government is assumed to have direct effects on many aspects of their lives. Therefore, the voter
in a first-order national election will most likely not select the parties that do not address fully
these issues. In second-order elections, on the other side, the national government is not selected
and the voter, in consequence, might vote for a party just because of the single domestic issue
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that concerns him or her the most. In the radical right case, this will arguably be the problem of
immigration.

Table 1 - The Radical Right in National and European Union elections 2014

Austria

FPO

National
Elections
20.5% (2013)

Belgium

VB

3.7% (2014)

4.26%

Bulgaria

Ataka

4.5% (2014)

2.96%

mixed

Croatia

HNS

2.8% (2011)

6.88%

proportional

Cyprus

ELAM

1.08% (2011)

2.69%

proportional

Czech Rep.

DSSS

0.86% (2013)

0.52%

proportional

DF

12.3% (2015)

26.60%

proportional

Country

Denmark

Party

European Elections
(2014)
19.72%

Electoral
System
proportional
proportional

Estonia

EKRE

8.1% (2015)

4.00%

proportional

Finland

PS

17.6% (2015)

12.90%

proportional
majoritarian

FN

3.66% (2012)

24.86%

Germany

NPD

1.5% (2013)

1%

mixed prop

Greece

GD

6.3% (2015)

9.39%

proportional

France

Jobbik

20.3% (2014)

14.67%

mixed prop

Italy

LN

4.10% (2013)

6.15%

mixed prop

Latvia

NA

16.6% (2014)

14.25%

proportional

Lithuania

TT

14.25%

mixed

Malta

IE

2.68%

proportional

Hungary

Netherlands

PVV

7.3 % (2012)
bellow 0.5%
(2013)
10.1% (2012)

13.32%

proportional

Poland

KNP

1.06% (2011)

7.15%

proportional

Portugal

PNR

0.31% (2011)

0.46%

proportional

Romania

PRM

1.47% (2012)

2.70%

mixed prop

Slovakia

SNS

4.6% (2012)

3.61%

proportional

Slovenia

SNS

2.2% (2014)

4.04%

proportional

SD
12.9% (2014)
9.67%
proportional
Sweden
United
UKIP
12.6% (2015)
26.77%
majoritarian
Kingdom
Sources: for the European Union elections - official website of the European Parliament
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/). For the national elections - IFES election guide
(http://www.electionguide.org/), and other national level sources.

In table 1, we can observe the differences in radical right parties’ performances across the
2014 European Union elections and the closest national elections. In most cases, the radical right
performed better in European Union elections. However, we have some negative cases as well,
most notably Hungary and Finland. Both cases can arguably be explained by the fact that we can
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hardly consider the Jobbik and the Finns party small parties anymore. Both of them are among
the most powerful parties in their countries. Therefore, voters might not be reluctant to vote for
them in national elections, and the second-order national elections theory does not apply
anymore. In four cases the distance between the elections was more than two years. Obviously,
time can have some effects here. The incentives of voters can change over time, and parties can
suffer internal crises, changes of leadership, or face different sort of scandals that could influence
their fortunes in different elections. Unfortunately, I cannot control for this kind of problems, and
I acknowledge that the time issue can be one of the possible shortcomings of this study.
From the discussion above derives the main hypothesis of this study: The type of election
in which it competes will have an impact on the success of the radical right party. Radical right
parties will most likely perform better in second-order national European Union elections than
in first-order national parliamentary elections.

4) Models and variables
I use quantitative methods to test my hypothesis for the difference in success of radical right
parties in national and European elections. First, I use a paired t-test model to compare radical
right parties’ performances in European and national elections. Second, I use two ordinary least
squares regression analysis models to explain the difference in party performances between the
two types of elections, and to reexamine the impact of the various explanatory variables for the
electoral fortunes of the radical right in national parliamentary elections. The obvious problem of
the two ordinary least squares regression models is the small number of observations, which
might affect the reliability of the results. The results of the testing therefore do not have an
absolute value, however they demonstrate significance and offer interesting suggestions. In the
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future, the inclusion of more elections should provide the quantitative testing with more
reliability.
In the first model, I test the hypothesis that radical right parties generally do better in
European Union elections in comparison to national elections. I employ a paired t-test model11
that allows me to demonstrate the average difference in the parties’ performances between the
two elections, and the statistical significance of this difference. This model has two dependent
variables. First, National elections, is the voteshare of the radical right in the closest national
parliamentary elections to the respective European Union elections. Second, EU elections, is the
voteshare of the radical right in European Union elections. The first paired t-test compares the
voteshare of the radical right in elections for the European parliament in 2009 with the voteshare
of the radical right in the corresponding national parliamentary elections. The second does the
same for the 2014 European Union and corresponding national parliamentary elections, and the
third for the combination of the two sets. I have only 23 observations in 2009 to 25 in 2014. That
is caused by the fact that in Estonia, to my knowledge, there was no radical right party
competing in the 2009 elections, and Croatia was not a member of the European Union in 2009
and therefore had no European elections that year. Both datasets exclude the countries where
there is no radical right party: Ireland and Luxembourg. Spain is also excluded because, although
the radical right exists there, it is so marginal that it was impossible for me to find voteshares of
any of the radical right parties for all sets of elections.
In the second model, I test for the indicators that possibly cause variance in the vote for
the radical right between European and national elections. The dependent variable is the
difference in the voteshare of the radical right between European and national elections

11

Rosie Shier. “Paired t-tests.” Mathematics Learning Support Center, accessed October 30, 2015,
http://www.statstutor.ac.uk/resources/uploaded/paired-t-test.pdf.
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(European – national). I have four independent variables. First, immigration the most important
national concern, captures peoples’ perceptions about immigration. Second, tendency not to trust
the national government, expresses peoples’ mistrust in their national governments. Third,
tendency not to trust the European Union, stands for peoples’ mistrust of the European Union.
Finally, electoral system, measures whether the electoral system is majoritarian or proportional.
I use Eurobarometer survey data from the beginning of the year 2010 for the 2009 set,
and from the end of the year 2014 for the 2014 set. As already explained, I believe that
Eurobarometer surveys present the most accurate estimates, especially for immigration. To
estimate the effects of the proportionality of the electoral system, I put 100% score for the
countries that adopt majoritarian electoral system – United Kingdom and France, and 0% score
for the countries that use more proportional electoral rules. Similarly to the previous model, I test
for the two sets of elections first separately and then combined. The two sets combined give me
the possibility to enlarge my number of observations and support the results obtained in the
single set tests.
Other variables for trust in national and European institutions could be added to the
model. I did not include them in my model for three reasons. First, since my model does not
contain a large number of observations, inclusion of more independent variables could cause
problems with the degrees of freedom. Second, in pre-testing of the model, all of these variables
were largely insignificant. Finally, I believe that the used trust variables generally capture the
perceptions of the people about the national government, and the European Union.
In the third model, I test for the impact of the discussed factors on the increase of the
radical right vote in national parliamentary elections. The dependent variable, national, is the
voteshare of the radical right in the most recent national parliamentary elections. The first two
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independent variables, immigration the most important national concern and tendency not to
trust the national government, express exactly the same as in the previous model. Two added
variables are unemployment, which captures the unemployment rates for each country, and
unemployment*immigration, which measures the interaction between unemployment and
concerns about immigration.
For measuring the concerns about immigration and tendency not to trust the national
government, I use Eurobarometer surveys from the years when the election took place (20112015). For unemployment, I use the rates for each year and each country provided by eurostat12.
As this model is used mostly to demonstrate the possible differences in the importance of the
same independent variables across European Union and national elections, I include only the
most recent national elections from the years 2011 till 2015.

12

“Unemployment rate, 2003-2014.” Eurostat, accessed October 30, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/File:Table_2_Unemployment_rate,_2003-2014_(%25).png
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Results
Table 2 –Model 1
The radical right performance in 2009 European and corresponding national elections
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev.
EU elections
23
0.0773087
0.0112003
0.0537147
national elections
23
0.0645522
0.0111984
0.0537057
diff
23
0.0127565
0.0072761
0.0348949
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9533
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0935
Pr(T > t) = 0.0467
The radical right performance in 2014 European and corresponding national elections
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev.
EU elections
25
0.094196
0.0162859
0.0814283
national elections
25
0.070752
0.0131098
0.0655488
diff
25
0.023444
0.0128206
0.0641029
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9600
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0799
Pr(T > t) = 0.0400
The radical right performance in 2009 and 2014 sets combined
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
EU elections
48
0.0861042
0.0100095
national elections
48
0.0677813
0.0086047
diff
48
0.0183229
0.0074964
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9908
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0183
Pr(T > t) = 0.0092

Std. Dev.
0.069348
0.0596149
0.0519364

[95% Conf. Interval]
.0540807 .1006367
.0413281 .0877763
-.0023332 .0278462

[95% Conf. Interval]
.0605836 .1278084
.0436948 .0978092
-.0030164 .0499044

[95% Conf. Interval]
.0659676 .1062407
.0504709 .0850916
.0032422 .0334037

In table 2, we can see the results of the first model. In all three paired t-tests the average
difference between the elections was positive and significant. In the 2009 set, the radical right
performed on average 1.3% better in EU elections. In the 2014, the average difference was even
higher at 2.3%, and in the combination of the 2009 and 2014 sets 1.8%. As we can see, all
differences in means were significant. This supports the suggestion that the radical right will
most likely perform better in European elections rather than in national parliamentary elections,
and allows us to test for the possible explanations of the variation in the vote across elections.
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Table 3 - Model2 and Model3 – OLS

Variable

Immigration the most important
national concern
Tendency not to trust the national
government

Difference
2014 EU and
corresponding
national
elections

Model 2
Difference
2009 EU and
corresponding
national
elections

Differences
EU/national
2009 and 2014
combined

Model 3
Radical right
performance
in national
elections 20112015

0.21**(0.09)

0.21**(0.09)

0.20***(0.06)

-0.59 (0.36)

0.14 (0.09)

0.06 (0.04)

0.10**(0.05)

-0.29 ***(0.09)

Unemployment

-0.58(0.58)

Unemployment*immigration

5.32 (5.15)

Electoral system
Tendency not to trust the European
Union
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,

0.13***(0.04)

0.05**(0.02)

0.09***(0.02)

-0.04(0.09)

-0.05 (0.07)

-0.04 (0.05)

-0.08(0.05)
25
0.54

-0.02 (0.04)
23
0.36

-0.06(0.03)
48
0.48

0.32***(0.07)
25
0.29

Table 3 shows the results of the two regression models. In the second model public
concerns about immigration had a positive and significant impact on the difference in voteshare
across national and European Union elections in both the 2009 and 2014 sets of elections, and an
even more significant (p<0.01) impact when the two sets were combined. The effects of
tendency to not trust the government were positive and close to significance (slightly above
p<0.05) in the separate sets, and significant when the two sets were combined. Tendency not to
trust the European Union had an insignificant impact in both the separate and combined sets of
elections. Finally, electoral system had significant and positive effects on the difference in the
vote for the radical right across the two types of elections in both the separate and combined sets.
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In the third model, public concerns about immigration had an insignificant impact on the
vote for the radical right in the most recent national elections. The tendency not to trust the
national government had a significantly negative impact. The effects of unemployment rates
alone were insignificant. Finally, the impact of the interaction between public concerns about
immigration and unemployment rates on the radical right vote in national elections was positive,
but insignificant.
Some of the results are worth highlighting. The significant effects of public concerns
about immigration in the second model and the insignificance of the same variable in the third
model seems to confirm our hypothesis that the voters in European Union elections vote more
sincerely and ideologically than in national elections. Voters in national elections are arguably
more strategic, and therefore vote for the party that has a better chance of winning the seats in
national parliament, no matter what their main concerns are. Moreover, it seems to confirm the
assumption that since voters are not selecting the national government in European Union
elections, they will be more prone to vote for the party that concentrates its agenda on a single
issue and offers more radical solutions to the problem that for the voter matters the most. In
national elections the voters will be less prone to vote for the same party as they will require the
party to address multiple issues, and will be more careful to cast their votes for radical parties as
there might be a possibility that these parties could govern them.
The positive impact of the tendency not to trust the government on the difference in the
vote between European Union and national elections, suggests the possibility of the protest vote
in European Union elections. This means that, by voting for a radical right party in European
Union elections, the voters try to send a message of discontent to the governing parties they have
voted for, or would vote for, in national elections. It also seems to confirm the validity of the
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second-order national elections model. The negative impact of the same variable on the success
of the radical right in national elections should not be that surprising in this context. It suggests
that, different to European Union elections, the vote for the radical right in national elections is
not a protest vote. Once again it seems correct to assume that the voters vote more strategically
rather than ideologically in national elections.
The insignificant effects of tendency not to trust the European Union on the increase of
the difference in the vote between European and national elections seems to confirm once again
the validity of the second-order national elections model. It suggests that voters will most likely
not vote for radical right parties because of their anti-EU agenda, and that voters still more likely
conceive of European Union elections as second-order national contests. Finally, the significant
and positive impact of the electoral system confirms that the difference in the voteshare of a
radical right party will be larger when the party moves from majoritarian to proportional
electoral rules, and confirms the hypothesis that mechanical and psychological factors of
majoritarian systems in general influence the electoral fortunes of radical right parties.

Conclusions
This study provides several contributions to the ongoing debate about the electoral
success of radical right parties. First, it is different to other studies about the radical right,
because I explain the success of radical right parties through comparison of radical right parties’
performances across national and European Union elections. The impact of the type of elections
on the success of the radical right has been rarely mentioned in the studies about the radical right,
and even when it has been, it has not been given any large importance, and has mostly remained
untested. Reif & Schmitt’s (1980) second-order national elections theory can be used as an
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explanation of the difference in the vote for the radical right across national and European Union
elections. The term ‘national’ is important here. European Union elections, although theoretically
about European Union issues, will most likely still be conceived of by voters as national
elections with a crucial difference: that national government is not elected in them. Radical right
parties seem likely to profit from this kind of settling as some scholars have suggested (Reif
1984; Almeida 2012). The results of the testing indeed seem to confirm the validity of the
second-order national elections model in explaining the difference in vote for the radical right
across national and European Union elections. It is possible that with time and enlargement of
the powers of the European Parliament, European issues will begin to matter. However, that
should not change the advantageous position of the radical right in these elections. Radical right
parties are usually parties that address European Union issues a lot, especially recently. Their
negative views on the European Union and the growing euroskepticism in European societies
give these parties a good chance to gain success in European elections, even if they lose their
second-order national contest nature. However, thus far the testing has not provided significant
evidence of an impact of European Union issues on the difference in the vote for the radical right
between national and European Union elections. The results of the testing also confirmed that the
change in electoral system, from majoritarian to proportional, would have a significant impact on
the radical right performance across the two types of elections. This should be a contribution to
the debate on the general impact of institutional factors on the success of the radical right.
Second, I also introduce a different kind of measurement for some key independent
variables. Particularly, I emphasize the importance of measuring immigration in terms of
peoples’ perceptions about it, rather than in terms of immigration rates. People usually do not
know how many immigrants are in the country, and even if they do, it does not necessarily mean
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that they are concerned with immigration and have negative views of it. Moreover, foreign-born
populace rates cannot take into account the number of illegal immigrants in the country. In
consequence, in this study, I use Eurobarometer public surveys about the most important national
concerns, which I believe offer a better kind of measurement of immigration than foreign-born
population rates.
Third, I believe that I bring some important insights on the conceptualization of radical
right parties. I do not believe that it is necessary to divide the radical right party family into
subgroups, at least if one is interested in the causes of radical right success. Similarities between
the parties across the assumed subfamilies, as well as disinclination of the most extremist parties
to openly state their most extremist stances, make it very difficult to erect clear boundaries
between the assumed subfamilies of the radical right. The subdivision of the radical right would
also make testing even more problematic. Significant updates have been made to the list of
radical right parties. Some of them have never appeared in studies on the radical right. I do not
pretend to be an expert on all of the parties in my dataset. In some cases, I have found more
evidence of the party’s radical right affiliation, and in other cases less. However, I believe that all
of the parties included are conceived by the voters as radical right. Obviously, national level
studies would be better fitted to confirm this assumption.
Four, I include the vast majority of European countries, including those from Central and
Eastern Europe. Most studies about the radical right are limited to Western Europe. There are
several successful radical right parties in the CEE as well that should not be excluded. Because
of the different socio-economic and socio-demographic realities, there might be large differences
in the kind of issues, and the way the parties address them, between Western and Eastern Europe.
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Not taking into account the CEE countries may therefore lead to misleading results in findings,
as we have seen in some of the studies mentioned here.
There are admittedly limitations to the study. The small number of observations might be
problematic. However, I believe that the findings I have are a good start, and bring some
important indications about the voters’ incentives to vote for the radical right in the different
types of elections. It would be interesting to observe if the trend outlined in this study will
continue. It might be also plausible for future research to look at the differences in radical right
performance between national and regional elections. If Reif & Schmitt’s (1980) theory is fully
valid, I would expect radical right parties to perform better in regional elections as well.
Obviously, national level studies would be better suited to this kind of research. Finally, although
I might have expressed some criticism of different theories, that does not mean that I do not
recognize the contribution of all the authors mentioned in this article. Without their work, this
study would hardly be possible.
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APPENDIX A
Radical right parties in the European Union
Country

Party

Austria

Freedom Party (FPO)

Belgium

Flemish Interest (VB)

Bulgaria

Attack (Ataka)

Croatia

Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)

Cyprus

ELAM

Czech Republic

Worker's party (DSSS)
Party of Direct Democracy (SPD)
National Democracy (ND)

Denmark

Danish People's Party (DF)

Estonia

EKRE

Finland

Finns Party (PS)

France

National Front (FN)

Germany

National Democratic Party (NPD)
Republikaner (Rep)

Greece

Golden Dawn

Hungary

Jobbik

Italy

League North (LN)
Forza Nuova (FN)
Casa Pound (CPI)

Latvia

National Alliance

Lithuania

Order and Justice (TT)

Malta

Imperium Europa (IE)

Netherlands

Party for Freedom (PVV)

Poland

Congress of the New Right (KNP)
National Movement (RN)
League of Polish Families (LPR)

Portugal

National Renovator Party (PNR)

Romania

Greater Romania Party (PRM)

Slovakia

Slovakian National Party (SNS)
People's Party - Our Slovakia (ĽSNS)

Slovenia

Slovenian National Party (SNS)

Spain

Espana 2000
National Democracy (DN)

Sweden

Sweden Democrats (SD)

United Kingdom

UK Independence Party (UKIP)
British National Party (BNP)
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